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Abstract 
 
Following the triumph of neoliberalism, trade and investment are considered 
to be the dominant routes to economic and social development. This has 
further enhanced the power of transnational corporations. Developing 
countries are increasingly expected to secure foreign investment to stimulate 
their economies and lift the local population out of poverty. However, foreign 
investment also has implications for protection and enjoyment of human 
rights. Transnational corporations manage their risks by imposing stabilization 
clauses on host countries that constrain their ability to protect and enhance 
human rights. Conventional accounting and corporate social responsibility 
reports seem to be unable to respond to the emerging agenda on human 
rights. This paper seeks to stimulate debates about the protection and 
enjoyment of human rights by drawing attention to the way corporations 
constrain governments and people through clauses in investment 
agreements. Some evidence is provided through an examination of an 
investment agreement relating to the Chad–Cameroon oil and pipeline project.  
The paper calls for the production of counter accounts to challenge the 
hegemony of corporations and create spaces for the enjoyment of human 
rights. 
 
Key words: Human Rights, Corporate Social Responsibility, Globalization, 
Stabilization Clauses. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The triumph of neoliberalism (Fukuyama, 1992) and the associated mobility of 
capital, privatizations, deregulation and a general roll-back of the state has 
increased corporate influence on the daily lives of the people and their right to 
food, water, shelter, security, paid employment, safety at work, clean 
environment and a non-discriminatory environment has deepened calls for 
greater corporate accountability (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005). Rather than 
enhancing democratic control of corporations1 and aligning corporate conduct 
with the basic human rights and freedoms, as enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights2 (UDHR), the trend has been to expand the 
scope of annual accounting reports published by corporations even though 
they are often a poor medium of corporate accountability (Jones, 2011). This 
has been supplemented by a variety of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
reports (for example, see Bakan, 2004; Banerjee, 2007; Cooper, 2004; 
Crowther and Rayman-Bacchus, 2004; Demirag, 2005; Frederick, 2006; 
Hawkins, 2006; Solomon, 2007). Some may laud the glossy CSR brochures 
as evidence of corporate responsiveness to public pressures, but much of this 
responsiveness is primarily linked to the ability to make profits (Unerman and 
O‟Dwyer, 2007).  There is a suspicion that a large volume of the CSR reports 
are self-serving (Sikka, 2010) and corporate disclosures are frequently 
selective and part of the ideological battle to both accommodate and resist 
change (Adams, 2004; Spence, 2009). As the chief executive of Unilever put 
it,  
"Corporate social responsibility is a hard-edged business decision. Not 
because it is nice to do or because people are forcing us to do it, or 
because I want to do nice interviews …, but because it is good for our 
business … This is a hard-edged business issue.” (The Guardian3, 5 
July 2003).  
 
                                                 
1 For example, through rights for local communities and employees to elect 
directors, public right of access to corporate agreements and subordinating 
corporate objectives to social priorities of eradication of poverty, discrimination 
and exclusion. 
2  This is available at available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ 
3 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/jul/05/unilever1; accessed 14 April 
2010. 
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The tensions between the hard-edged business practices geared to 
increasing profits for shareholders and the enjoyment of human rights by the 
people (Amnesty International, 2006; Christian-Aid, 2008; Environmental 
Defense Fund, 1999; ETC Group, 2008) have persuaded some to argue that 
corporate power cannot easily be reconciled with democracy and respect for 
human rights  (Hertz, 2001; Bakan, 2004). Increasingly, there are calls for the 
development of alternative forms of accounting and “binding legal norms that 
hold corporations to human rights standards and circumscribe potential 
abuses of their position of power” (United Nations, 2003, p. 20).  
 
The corporate responsibility to respect and protect human rights arises from 
developments in international law (Ratner, 2001; Jochnick, 1999) and 
obligations arising out of the1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights4 
(UDHR) and related treaties5 and articles promulgated by the United Nations 
(UN). The UDHR commits all UN member states to respect, protect and 
enforce the human rights of every individual to a standard of living for 
adequate health and wellbeing, including the right to food, clothing, medical 
care, housing and social services. It guarantees that everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. No one is to be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile and everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental 
rights granted to them by law. The UDHR preamble states that it is “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” and requires 
that  
 
                                                 
4  This is available at available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ 
5 The principles of UDHR have been codified into a number of treaties, 
conventions and binding legal obligations (Cronin-Furman, 2010). Chief 
amongst these is the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which covers matters such as the freedom from 
gender, religious and racial discrimination; right to life, work for a fair wage, 
education, decent living, housing and food, safe and healthy working 
conditions, form trade unions and the right to the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health. The ICESCR is accompanied by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and requires 
each state to protect the civil and political rights of individuals, including 
freedom of religion, speech, assembly, association, join a political party, vote, 
right to life and equality before the law. 
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“every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration 
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member 
States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their 
jurisdiction”.  
 
The informed legal opinion is that the UDHR reference (see above) to “every 
individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of 
society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace. The 
Universal Declaration applies to them all” (International Council on Human 
Rights Policy, 2002, p. 159). Thus obligations to respect and protect human 
rights and provide a remedy for injured parties rests not only on the state but 
also on corporations6 (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2008), 
considered to be an important “organ of society” (see above).  
 
The focus on corporations arises from the intensification of globalization and 
the related increase in the power of corporations. Transnational corporations 
are now a key source of cross-border investment and their quest for private 
profits frequently brings them in conflict with workers and local communities 
(Korten, 2001; Klein, 2001). Developing countries may welcome foreign 
investment to generate jobs and economic development, but it can also have 
an adverse effect on enjoyment of human rights, including labour rights, 
security, sovereignty of the state and even the right to life. Corporations have 
been accused of lax health and safety standards and inflicting death and 
injuries on innocent people (Hanna et al, 2005). By avoiding taxes, 
corporations deprive governments of scarce resources which could be used to 
develop social infrastructure and improve the quality of life of people by 
providing education, healthcare, security and pensions (Global Witness, 2006; 
Christian-Aid, 2008). In pursuit of profits, some corporations have also 
colluded with murderous and corrupt regimes (Black, 2001; Rowell et al., 
2005; Clark, 1994). Yet the quality of corporate profits and their consequences 
                                                 
6 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
recommends that “enterprises should … respect the human rights of those 
affected by their activities consistent with the host government‟s international 
obligations and commitments” (OECD, 2000, p. 11). However, its 
recommendations are non-binding and considered to be “weak” (Ratner, 
2001, p. p. 457). 
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for human rights is not evident from annual financial reports or glossy CSR 
brochures. 
 
This paper seeks to encourage debates about corporate power and human 
rights and calls for the accounting and corporate social responsibility literature 
to connect with human rights. It highlights concerns about intensification of 
globalization and the rising power of corporations through an examination of 
the risk-management strategies used by transnational corporations. These 
include placing constraints, known as stabilization clauses, on the ability of 
many developing countries to protect human rights by disabling their capacity 
to develop regulation, levy taxes; improve labour, health and safety and 
environmental standards and constraining their citizens from seeking 
remedies in local courts of law. This paper illustrates and discusses the above 
issues by firstly examining the nature of contemporary globalization, which 
has facilitated economic growth, but also generated vast income and wealth 
inequalities. The dominant discourses persuade poorer countries to alleviate 
poverty by inviting foreign trade and investment. However, such processes 
also pose serious questions about the protection and enjoyment of human 
rights. The next section provides an illustration of the stabilization clauses 
through an examination of an investment agreement relating to the Chad-
Cameroon oil and pipeline project. After discussing some of the social and 
political issues raised by the constraints it considers implications of the 
stabilization clauses for accounting and accountability. The final section then 
reflects upon the paper and calls for sustained research to advance human 
rights. 
 
2. Globalization and Foreign Investment 
 
Corporations are a major centre of power in contemporary capitalism. From its 
very inception capitalism was meant to be a global affair (Marx and Engels, 
2002). It has not been accompanied by any economic and moral limits on the 
quest for private profits and thus capital is incessantly seeking new 
opportunities to make profits. Rapid advances in transport, communications 
and information technologies have freed capital from the prison of territorial 
limits. Constrained by the ideologies of neoliberalism, the contemporary state 
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is obliged to stimulate the economy through private investment, tax incentives 
and re/deregulation. The mobility of capital and flow of goods and services 
has been intensified by structural adjustment programmes and free trade 
zones, such as the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). The mobility of capital and the power of transnational corporations 
has been further intensification of globalization has been accompanied by an 
institutional architecture, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
In the integrated global economy, the availability of technology, money, 
organizational structures, ideology and political patronage have made 
corporations the dominant force of our times. Global capitalism anticipated by 
Marx and Engels is already with us7 (Hertz, 2001; Korten, 2001; Trade Union 
Congress, 2005; United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2000; 
Rugman, 2005). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world trade is 
dominated by an estimated 78,000 transnational companies with some 
780,000 affiliates. 52 of the largest 100 economies in the world are 
corporations, mostly headquartered in the western world, and the annual 
sales revenue of each of the six largest corporations are exceeded by the 
GDP of only 21 countries. In 2002, the top 200 corporations had combined 
sales equivalent to 28% of world GDP8. Nearly 70% of the world trade and 
80%-90% of the foreign direct investment is controlled by just 500 
corporations and a mere 1% of corporations own half the total stock of foreign 
direct investment (Korten, 2001; Rugman, 2005). The annual global foreign 
direct investment (FDI) reached a peak of US$2 trillion in 2007 and despite a 
deepening economic recession it is expected to be $1.8 trillion in 2011 
(UNCTAD, 2009). Some 48% of the global FDI flows to developing and 
transition economies giving corporations enormous influence on the terms and 
the nature of the trade.  
 
                                                 
7 Also see the website of  Share The World's Resources 
(http://www.stwr.org/multinational-corporations/multinational-corporations-
mncs-beyond-the-profit-motive.html; accessed on 13 May 2010) 
8 http://www.stwr.org/imf-world-bank-trade/reforming-international-trade.html 
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Through trade, mergers and acquisitions, corporations have not only acquired 
vast monopoly powers, but with it also the power to shift jobs, investment, 
taxes and the power to discipline states. According to the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization (2000), just 20 corporations control the global 
coffee trade; only 3 account for over 80% of the global cocoa trade; 6 of them 
hold 70% of wheat trade and one controls 98% of the production of packed 
tea. Just 10 global corporations control 55% of the global trade in 
pharmaceuticals; 67% of the trade in seed and fertilisers; 55% of the 
pharmaceutical trade; and 66% of the global biotechnology industry (ETC 
Group, 2008). By any standard transnational corporations wield considerable 
power and their intervention in large scale trade and investment is 
unavoidable even though their commitment to any locality, product and people 
is temporary and conditional upon profits. 
 
The intensification of globalization is accompanied by extreme inequalities. A 
2006 UN report estimated that the richest 1% of adults, mostly resident in the 
West, own more than 40% of the planet's wealth and a mere 10% command 
85% of the world total of global assets, but the bottom 50% own just 1%.(the 
Guardian, 6 December 2006; also see Davies et al., 2008). At the same time, 
around 2.1 billion people, mostly living in mineral rich developing countries, 
survive on less than $2 a day and 880 million on less than $1 a day (World 
Bank, 2008). More than 1 billion people do not have access to safe drinking 
water. About 1.9 million people die every year from diarrheal diseases and 
around 1.5 million (or 5,000 a day) of the fatalities are children under the age 
of five (Water Aid, 2007). A child born in a less developed country is almost 14 
times more likely to die during the first 28 days of life than a child born in an 
industrialized country. Low-income countries provide an average 10 beds per 
10,000 people compared to 63 in Europe. Around 80% of maternal deaths 
could be averted if women had access to essential maternity and basic health-
care services. The infant mortality rate9 for Finland, France, Germany, UK and 
US is 3.7, 4.2, 4.3, 4.8 and 6.3 respectively, whilst for Angola, Congo, China, 
Ghana, India, Nigeria and Tanzania the rates are 131.9, 70.3, 23.0, 56.6, 
55.0, 109.5 and 72.6 respectively (United Nations, 2007). Out of an estimated 
                                                 
9 The number of deaths of infants below the age of one in a given year per 
1,000 live births in the same year. 
 9 
total of 2.2 billion children, over 1 billion live in poverty (UNICEF, 2004). An 
estimated 640 million lack basic shelter, 500 million do not have adequate 
sanitation facilities, 400 million lack access to safe water, 270 million have no 
access to healthcare, 140 million have never been to school and 90 million 
face daily starvation. An estimated 774 million adults lack basic literacy skills 
(UNESCO, 2007). Due to pressure on revenues, 34 out of 84 countries have 
decreased the share of gross national product (GNP) devoted to education 
since 1999. 24 out of 105 countries allocated less than 3% of GNP to 
education. Such inequalities encourage poor nations to seek foreign 
investment, which brings considerable complexities to the enjoyment and 
protection of human rights. 
 
Prominent economists, politicians, journalists and other opinion formers 
routinely advance the view that trade is the only way to alleviate poverty, 
secure economic prosperity and provide a decent standard of living for 
citizens. This worldview is promoted by the World Bank, IMF and WTO and 
also embedded in the Millennium Development Goals promoted by the United 
Nations for eradication of poverty in developing countries (United Nations, 
2004, 2005). As developing countries often lack the financial resources and 
technical know-how to exploit their natural resources, they frequently turn to 
global agencies (e.g. IMF, World Bank) and transnational corporations to 
provide investment through a variety of bilateral, multilateral, direct and joint 
investment programmes and treaties. The supply and demand for investment 
is driven by competing and complementary motives. Transnational 
corporations are primarily motivated by profits as companies seek competitive 
advantage through the creation, defence or expansion of market shares, low 
costs, low social obligations (such as taxes) and access to raw materials and 
other inputs for production of goods and services. Foreign investment is 
attractive to developing countries in that it not only provides local employment 
and tax revenues, but can also generate foreign exports, either to the 
investing company‟s home country, or to third-country markets, which in turn 
can fuel further investment, employment and possibly a way out of poverty. 
Foreign investment may be used to import technology and know-how to build 
infrastructure (schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, transport, electricity and 
water facilities), but it may also displace governments or perform the functions 
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traditionally associated with governments – for example corporations may 
distribute food, run schools, hospitals and security services. This may all be 
considered to be part of trade, but poses serious questions about the 
boundaries between the state and corporations where exactly the 
responsibility for protection of human rights lies. Citizens may expect to hold 
governments to account through the ballot-box for the provision, or lack 
thereof, of public goods, but the same is not possible when these services are 
provided by corporations. Elected parliaments may debate government 
policies and demand to see relevant documents, but corporate contracts are 
confidential and considered to be private and are thus not available to 
citizens, or their representatives. Admittedly, some strong governments may 
be able to challenge corporations or negotiate arrangements to bring some 
contracts under public scrutiny, but the governments of many poor countries 
lack the necessary financial, legal and administrative resources to secure that. 
It is also possible for corporations to subvert any local drive for protection of 
human rights through alliances with local elites or by influencing the 
governments of their home countries to exert pressure on less powerful 
governments and thus safeguard their investment and profits. Faced with the 
pressing need to stimulate the economy and reduce poverty, many poor and 
weak developing countries yield to corporate demands and accept constraints 
on their sovereign right to enact laws and regulations that protect human 
rights and meet their UDHR obligations.  
 
Since foreign investment is driven by the search for profits, transnational 
corporations are focused on the risks of investment, particularly the 
commercial and political risks of investing in another country with a different 
legal and political system. Corporations can hedge against foreign exchange 
and interest rate risks through transactions in complex financial instruments, 
investment guarantees, export finance and insurance10 provided by their 
home country governments (Gianturco, 2001). Such support is often driven by 
domestic economic and employment considerations and rarely requires the 
transnational corporation to conduct its foreign operations in a manner which 
                                                 
10 Another reason for the state support is that the private sector is often 
unwilling or unable to solely underwrite the risks associated with foreign trade. 
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will fulfil the home and the host state‟s obligations under the UDHR to protect 
and respect human rights. 
 
There is the issue of political risks and unilateral actions by the host 
governments, especially as after huge expenditure the investing company 
cannot easily abandon the project and is at the mercy of the host government. 
Corporate foreign investment is conditional upon generating acceptable 
returns, which in turn are dependent upon assumptions about wage rates, 
pension contributions, taxes, environmental, energy, regulatory, transport 
levies and a variety of other costs for the duration of the project, which could 
last for decades. In response to domestic pressures, the host government 
may make concessions to its citizens, and in the process alter costs and 
profits expected by investors. In addition, it is also possible that for ideological, 
economic and social reasons, the operations of foreign corporations could be 
wholly or partially nationalised, or sequestrated by host governments. Even if 
the incumbent government honours the contract, there is no guarantee that 
future governments will, especially when the countries have a tradition of 
coups and counter-coups. They may pay appropriate financial compensation 
immediately, or the negotiations could go on for many years. The host country 
laws may not adequately protect property rights, or the legal processes to 
secure redress may be cumbersome and costly. Thus the very act of foreign 
investment throws up a variety of risk management problems. Human rights 
issues are nested in the cauldron of competing objectives of corporations, 
host governments and the people‟s aspirations for a better quality of life. 
 
One approach to managing this conflict is to draft international treaties and 
agreements that prioritise human rights and the ability of the local population 
to influence host governments to secure social change over the narrow 
corporate concerns about maximisation of profits. However, such treaties and 
agreements are not on the immediate horizon. For a considerable time, 
governments, or government sponsored entities, negotiated bilateral 
investment treaties and a patchwork of rules and regulations, reflecting the 
respective bargaining power of the parties, emerged. Until the mid-1990s the 
OECD and the WTO sought to develop a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI), and the proposed rules seemed to limit the sovereign 
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powers of the host states and advance the power of transnational 
corporations at the expense of human rights, democracy, labour and 
environmental standards (see Picciotto and Mayne, 1999; Arnold, 2005). The 
rules placed limits on the powers of governments to support domestic 
companies and restricted their powers in directing or discriminating against 
foreign companies in sensitive areas (e.g. defence, environment, security 
sensitive regions, forested areas). The rules also legitimised the creation of 
international arbitration panels (rather than the host countries‟ courts) to 
adjudicate on disputes and enabled corporations to sue elected governments 
for introducing laws (e.g. healthcare, pensions, and environment) which could 
be detrimental to corporate profits. In the face of organized opposition from 
civil society and non-governmental organizations, the MAI negotiations were 
abandoned (Neumayer, 1999; Tieleman, 2000). In many ways, the MAI 
framework legitimised the conditions already imposed upon developing 
countries, and the collapse of the negotiations did not lead to any new 
enlightened global framework for protecting human rights, though negotiations 
continue (for example see, United Nations Human Rights Council, 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, the nature of foreign investment agreements (these are directly 
between the host governments and transnational corporations) and bilateral 
investment treaties (these are mainly between governments) primarily rests 
upon the relative bargaining strength of the parties involved and established 
norms. Since the early twentieth-century US companies have inserted 
stabilization clauses in foreign investment contracts agreements with 
developing countries. Early clauses tended to ban the host state from 
nationalising the project and/or required the consent of both contracting 
parties to modify the investment contract, but gradually the scope of the 
clauses has been broadened to stabilize or freeze specific aspects of a 
project, including its fiscal and regulatory regime. Such clauses come in many 
varieties and are now widely used by transnational corporations to manage 
the non-commercial risks (fiscal, regulatory, political) by stabilizing or freezing 
the terms and conditions of a project (Leader, 2006; Shemberg, 2008; 
Nwaokoro, 2010; Černič, 2010). They generally guarantee the investors 
(mostly in the West) that the domestic laws affecting the investment will 
remain unchanged, or frozen, during the lifetime of the project. The clauses 
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either do not allow new laws to apply to the project, or force host governments 
to compensate investors for compliance with new laws, especially where they 
erode the returns promised to investors (Cotula, 2008). The clauses are 
usually accompanied by arrangements for arbitration. Such clauses constrain 
the ability of a sovereign state to legislate, protect human rights and meet its 
international obligations. Given the obvious conflicts, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has called for a balance to 
be struck “between the legitimate commercial expectations of an investor 
party and the right of a host country party to oversee the evolution of the 
resulting relationship in a manner that is consistent with national development 
policies11” (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 45). However, the investment agreements and 
treaties are ultimately shaped by asymmetries of power and are often found to 
be “one-sided instruments. They are concerned with limiting the measures 
that may be taken by governments against foreign investors or foreign owned 
investments. The treaties contain a series of rights for inward capital – 
protection against expropriation, guarantees of non-discrimination, and 
freedom to transfer funds out of a host state – but they lack any counter-
balancing investor responsibilities” (Peterson, 2006, p. 20).  
 
The investor agreements tend to be confidential, but in recent years some 
have attracted the attention of civil society and non-governmental 
organizations. One such agreement related to the development of Chad-
Cameroon oil and pipeline project and illustrates the concerns outlined above. 
 
3. The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline  
 
3.1 The Investment Project and Agreements 
 
At more than US$3.5 billion12, the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project was 
one of the largest ever private-sector investment projects in Africa.  The 
project was initially established in 1988 between the government of Chad and 
                                                 
11 A weaker and more neoliberal version is advocated by the OECD (2002) 
which advises that the stabilization clauses should not grant blanket 
exemptions or rights to compensation, but should be restricted to clearly 
specified legislation and clearly specified compensation terms.  
 
12 By 2007, the project cost was estimated to be  $4.2 billion (Gary and  
Reisch, 2005, p. 6) 
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a consortium of oil companies for exploration of oil. The initial permit was valid 
until 2004 and was accompanied by a 30 year concession to develop 300 
oilfields around Doba in south-western Chad, but in 2004 the period was 
extended to 35 years with an automatic extension for another 35 years, if 
needed – i.e., it could last for 70 years. The second portion of the project, 
commencing in 1997, involved the construction of a 1,070 kilometre (650 
miles) pipeline from land-locked Chad to Cameroon‟s Atlantic coast at Kribi 
where a floating storage offloading facility was to be built. This agreement was 
for 25 years, with a renewal option for another 25 years, if needed – i.e., it 
could last for 50 years. The projects are covered by a number of agreements 
and protocols between the Republic of Cameron and the Republic of Chad 
and a consortium of companies, which included ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, 
and Petronas, the Malaysian state oil company.  
 
The consortium planned to produce and export around 225,000 barrels of oil a 
day, mostly to Europe and the USA. Most of the 1,070 kilometre (650 mile) 
pipeline had to be built underground (which makes leakage difficult to detect) 
and pass through virgin rainforest that has been the traditional home for a 
Pygmy minority of hunters and gatherers and thus had the potential to affect 
their culture and livelihood. The oil company consortium contributed about 
80% of the finance for the project and the remainder came from export credit 
agencies, the World Bank‟s International Finance Corporation, the European 
Investment Bank and private sector banks. Under the agreement, the 
governments of Chad and Cameron formed two joint-venture companies, the 
Chad [Tchad] Oil Transportation Company (TOTCO) and the Cameroon Oil 
Transportation Company (COTCO), to own and operate the projects. The oil 
companies were the majority shareholders of both TOTCO and COTCO and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (one of the five 
constituents of the World Bank) provided a loan of $90 million to enable Chad 
and Cameroon to finance their minority holding (about 3%) in the companies. 
The project was brokered by the World Bank, and all of the providers of 
finance claimed to voluntarily adopt the highest social and environmental 
standards (Amnesty International, 2005). For example, ExxonMobil, the 
biggest investor in the project, claims that “We promote respect for human 
rights, not just because doing so fosters a stable and productive business 
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environment, but more importantly, because it is the right and responsible 
thing to do. We believe our business presence should have a positive 
influence on the people in the communities in which we operate. 
…ExxonMobil‟s approach to respecting human rights consists of several core 
elements, including building local economic capacity … adhering to corporate 
policies and expectations … applying national laws and universally recognized 
principles, and engaging with external groups …” (ExxonMobil, 2010, p. 45). 
 
The project offered possibilities of economic development for Chad and 
Cameroon, ranked respectively at 167th and 141st place in the UN 
Development Programme‟s Human Development Index and an average life 
expectancy of 44.7 years and 46.8 years respectively (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2004). Around 80% of Chad‟s population13 and 
40% of Cameroon‟s population14 lives on less than $1 a day. The World Bank 
estimated that the project would generate revenues of around US$2 billion 
from royalties and taxes for Chad15 over the 25-year life of the project. 
Cameroon was expected to receive nearly $500 million from taxes and transit 
fees. The World Bank notes that during the initial construction phase (the first 
three years), the project employed 13,000 local people16 and many received 
technical training for the job. In the same period, around $740 million in 
procurement was allocated to local contractors for services such as truck 
transportation, civil works, vehicle maintenance and food catering. ExxonMobil 
                                                 
13 As per the World Bank‟s press release on 16 September, 2004 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/C
HADEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20255280~menuPK:349881~pagePK:141137~piP
K:141127~theSitePK:349862,00.html; accessed on 10 May 2010) 
14 As per the World Bank‟s website 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/CA
MEROONEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20375876~menuPK:753511~pagePK:149761
8~piPK:217854~theSitePK:343813,00.html; accessed 20 May 2010). 
15 “In late 2003, ExxonMobil made its first royalty payment into the 
government of Chad‟s account at Citibank in London, and Chad was likely to 
receive $140-150 million in oil revenues during 2004 and over $200 million in 
2005. Over their 25-year production span, the first three oil fields in southern 
Chad may earn the government  more than $5 billion in oil revenues” (Gary 
and Reisch, 2005, p.1) 
16 As per an IFC fact sheet 
(http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/eir.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/ChadCameroonPipeline1/
$FILE/CHAD+CAMEROON+PIPELINE+FACT+SHEET.pdf; accessed 26 Jun 
2010). 
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explained that “88 percent of the 5,700 people employed by the project in 
Chad at year-end 2007 were nationals. Total direct employment in Cameroon 
is 1,200; 91 percent are Cameroonian17”. In contrast, local NGOs claim that 
only about 500 people in both countries received permanent employment, 
often in low-paid positions at an average monthly wage of US$225, 
considerably less than the amounts paid to foreign workers18.  A field study by 
Sikod (2006) noted that in the rural areas where the underground pipeline was 
located, the unskilled and semi-skilled work was mainly performed by local 
males between the ages of 18 and 45. The employment of local people 
depended on the terrain and the geographical size of the village, especially as 
on average about two kilometres of pipeline was laid a day. Around 90% of 
the people said that their employment lasted from one day to 60 days. Around 
28 persons per village secured some employment on the pipeline project at 
daily rates of between 1,200 and 7,000 Communaute Financiere Africaine 
(CFA) francs (between US$2 and US$12). The International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) reported that 4,000 workers were forced to do 
unpaid overtime worth some 6 thousand million CFA francs to complete the 
project ahead of schedule and in 2005 workers‟ protests were met with a 
police crackdown resulting in arrests, injuries and deaths19.  
 
The project had the potential to provide economic development, but it also 
had the potential to cause loss of farmlands, sustainable livelihoods, 
displacement of communities and the accompanying loss of cultural identities. 
In particular, the project posed challenges for the wellbeing of the indigenous 
peoples‟ “right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, 
economic, social and cultural institutions … rights to life, physical and mental 
integrity, liberty … right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or 
destruction of their culture” and the state‟s obligations to “provide effective 
mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for … Any action which has the 
                                                 
17 As per ExxonMobil brochure “profile: Chad/Cameroon – Doba Basin” 
(http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/news_pub_poc_chad.pdf; 
accessed on 14 June 2010).  
18  http://www.fossilfreeeib.org/fp_detail.php?fpID=16; accessed on 14 June 
2010. 
19http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991222845&Language=EN
; accessed 20 June 2010. 
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aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources … 
Any form of forced population transfer” (United Nations, 2008, p. 5). 
 
Right from the beginning, civil society organisations were concerned that the 
revenues could be misused, may not go to the regions affected by the 
development or be used to alleviate poverty or build social infrastructure. 
Such concerns were aired because Chad and Cameroon are distinguished by 
high levels of corruption. For example, in 2005, Chad was named as the 
world‟s most corrupt country, ranked joint 158th by Transparency 
International20 and Cameroon was ranked 137th. Chad also has a long history 
of civil war, political instability, a weak judicial system and widespread 
corruption (Amnesty International, 2005; Gary and Reisch, 2005). Since 1990, 
Chad has been ruled by General Idriss Déby, who came to power in an army 
coup and became President in 1991 and was re-elected in 1996 and 2001. In 
June 2005, a referendum eliminated the constitutional limit of two-terms and 
General Idriss Déby stood for the office of president. Amidst claims of political 
repression he was re-elected in 2006 (BBC News21, 2 February 2008). 
Various coups against his regime have been foiled in 2006 and 2008 (BBC 
News, 15 March 200622; 4 February 200823). Witnesses claim that opposition 
leaders have been carried off by armed men in uniforms with no insignias and 
have not been heard from since (New York Times, 12 February 2008). 
Chadian armed forces continue to be accused of human rights abuses against 
the civilian population, including deliberate and arbitrary killings and rape, 
especially in southern oil-rich regions (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 15).  
 
Since 1982, Cameroon has been ruled by President Paul Biya, considered to 
be one of the world‟s twenty worst living dictators, and Wallechinsky (2006) 
notes that “every few years Biya stages an election to justify his continuing 
reign, but these elections have no credibility. In fact, Biya is credited with a 
                                                 
20 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005; 
accessed 2 June 2010. 
21 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7224008.stm; accessed 13 May 
2010. 
22 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4808758.stm; accessed 13 May 
2010. 
23 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7225023.stm; accessed 13 May 
2010. 
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creative innovation in the world of phony elections. In 2004, annoyed with the 
criticisms of international vote-monitoring groups, he paid for his own set of 
international observers, six ex-U.S. congressmen, who certified his election as 
free and fair” (p. 6-7). The average annual income per capita in Cameroon is 
around $1,000, but in 2009 President Biya is reported to have spent $40,000 
a day on a twenty-day long holiday in a five star Paris hotel (Daily Mail24, 6 
September 2009). Amnesty International (2005) notes that in his regime 
“torture persists and political prisoners have continued to die in appalling 
prison conditions after unfair trials. Opposition activists and human rights 
defenders remain at risk of being detained, and their peaceful political 
activities are frequently obstructed by the authorities” (p. 8).  
 
To pacify critics and address possible concerns about corruption, the World 
Bank negotiated a deal under which the net incomes due to Cameroon and 
Chad were to be deposited into a bank account in London, pending audits. 
Some 10% of the revenues were earmarked for a Future Generations Fund 
and civil society representatives and a member of the opposition were to be 
part of a monitoring board. The project had to meet the World Bank‟s 
safeguard policies on environmental assessments and resettlements, and two 
national parks were to be created to compensate for the loss of a small forest. 
In 1998, the Chadian government introduced the Oil Revenues Management 
Act and under this more than 80% of the project revenues were to be invested 
in education, water, rural development, infrastructure, environment and 
healthcare. Cameroon created the Foundation for Development and 
Environment to oversee the project‟s impact on the environment and 
indigenous people. Nevertheless, the project was mainly governed by the 
terms of the investment agreement (or Convention of Establishment) which 
made no mention of human rights, but contained the following stabilization 
clauses. 
 
24.1 The Republic of Cameroon guarantees the stability of legal, tax, 
customs and exchange control regime applicable to the activities 
undertaken under this Convention, as defined in article 30.1, as 
                                                 
24 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1211368/President-
Cameroon-attacked-25-000-day-holiday.html; accessed 10 June 2010. 
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well as the stability of the terms and conditions of this 
Convention. 
 
24.2 With regard to the activities undertaken under this Convention, 
the Republic of Cameroon shall not modify such legal, tax, 
customs, and exchange control regime in such a way as to 
adversely affect the rights and obligations of COTCO, 
Shareholders, Affiliates, Contractors, Shippers or Lenders 
arising from this Convention and no legislative, regulatory or 
administrative measure contrary to the provisions of this 
Convention shall apply to the persons mentioned above without 
COTCO‟s prior written consent. 
 
24.3 (a) Where COTCO is of the opinion that a legislative, regulatory 
or administrative measure which has been taken by the Republic 
of Cameroon adversely affects the rights and obligations of 
COTCO, Shareholders, Affiliate, Contractors, Sub-Contractors, 
Shippers or Lenders arising from this Convention, COTCO has 
the right to request that such measures not apply to the persons 
mentioned above with respect to activities undertaken under this 
Convention… 
 
24.4 The Republic of Cameroon shall not undertake any 
nationalisation or expropriation affecting assets belonging to 
COTCO, Shareholders, Affiliates, Contractors, Sub-Contractors, 
Shippers or Lenders. However, if circumstances or an 
emergency imperatively call for such measures, the Republic of 
Cameroon agrees that, in accordance with the principles of 
international law, a fair and equitable compensation, of which 
one of the elements covers any remaining debt arising from the 
financing of the construction of the Cameroon Transportation 
system. Shall be paid within a time period that conforms to the 
principle of international law … 
 
Article 25 of the agreement lists the taxes, custom duties and charges that the 
company will be exempt from for the entire duration of the project. Article 30 
expressly outlines the national laws and regulations that are to apply to the 
project and also outlines those which are not to be applied. Other national 
laws and regulations may be applied to the project only where they are 
consistent with the investment agreements. If the national laws and regulation 
conflict with the terms of the agreement itself then the agreement clauses are 
to prevail. Article 36 of the agreement sets up a dispute settlement procedure 
with the cases being heard before the Washington DC based International 
 20 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes25 (ICSID) and any awards made 
by it are to be considered to be “final and irrevocable (Article 36.4).  
 
Similar clauses are also to be found in the agreement, written in French, 
between the government of Chad and the consortium. For example, Article 
21.3 of the TOTCO-Chad agreement states that 
 
“During the term of this Convention, the Republic of Chad guarantees 
that no governmental act taken after December 19, 1988 will be applied 
to TOTCO, without prior agreement between the Parties, which has the 
duly established effect of increasing, directly, indirectly or by virtue of 
its application to Shareholders, the obligations and charges imposed by 
this Convention or which has the effect of adversely affecting the rights 
and economic benefits of TOTCO or of Shareholders as provided for in 
this Convention, including the effect duly established and passed on to 
TOTCO of the adverse effect on the charges of Affiliates or of the 
Contractors as a result of such act” (cited in Amnesty International, 
2005, p. 22). 
 
The Chad agreement gives the oil companies powers associated with 
exploration, extraction and transportation of oil, use of roads, clay, sand and 
occupation of land. The consortium promises to indemnify people for the 
damage but the terms and the nature of damage are not specified (Leader, 
2006). The investment agreement provides that the “Consortium must 
conform scrupulously … to the laws and regulations of the Republic of Chad 
insofar as the Convention does not indicate otherwise”, but an accompanying 
clause adds that 
 
 “All references to these laws and regulations throughout this 
Convention will not be interpreted in any way that either directly or 
indirectly increases the obligations and [financial burdens] imposed on 
the Consortium by this Convention, nor will it prejudice the rights and 
economic advantages of the Consortium as they are provided for by 
the present Convention” (cited in Leader, 2006, p. 78 and footnote 66).  
 
                                                 
25 ICSID is part of the World Bank and its primary purpose is to provide 
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes (for 
further details see, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=ShowHome&pageName=AboutICSID_Home). 
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In the case of Chad, disputes were to be decided by the Paris-based 
International Chamber of Commerce26. The arbitrator can have regard to the 
domestic law but may often be under specific instructions from the contract. 
The Chad/Cameroon project instructs that the interpretation must not “… 
prejudice the rights and economic advantages of the investor” (cited in 
Leader, 2006, p. 677).  
 
Agreements for both Chad and Cameroon specify that if the countries decide 
to change the regulatory environment around the project, they should seek the 
prior consent of the oil consortium (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 22). 
Despite the claims by ExxonMobil (see above), the agreements do not 
mention human rights and do not exclude the possibility that Chad and 
Cameroon could be penalised for steps taken to improve the material 
condition of their citizens, or laws introduced to protect and conform with the 
state‟s human rights obligations27.  
 
The investment agreements with the consortium of oil companies, 
accompanied by an Environment Management Plan drafted in 1999, were 
approved by the World Bank. The net effect of the agreements is to give 
special privileges to companies on legislative, taxation, customs, exchange 
control and other matters to enable them to carry out the project and these 
privileges could last for more 50-70 years. The pipeline was completed in July 
2003 and production from the oilfields reached their peak capacity 225,000 
barrels in late 2004. 
 
The project had considerable positives as the World Bank set-up oversight 
panels and involved civil society panels in monitoring the project, but the 
outcomes were very different. Nguiffo (2005) notes that when NGOs and local 
communities raised concerns about workers‟ rights, the World Bank 
Inspection Panel told them that worker rights did not fall under its mandate. 
The Panel also told them that it did not have a policy on contractual business 
                                                 
26 The International Chamber of Commerce has permanent observer status 
with the United Nations. 
27 Governments fearful of upsetting investors may voluntarily minimise the risk 
of disputes and thus dilute their actions for protecting human rights. 
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relationships between the consortium and small local businesses. Although 
policies existed on access to water and compensation, the Inspection Panel 
told the communities that they had to first prove the quality of their water was 
negatively affected. Since the communities had no access to prior scientific 
evidence to support their case, most of the complaints were dismissed due to 
lack of evidence. Farmers in Cameroon complained that they did not receive 
adequate compensation for loss of farms and land. The compensation for the 
loss of raffia trees was 120 times below their market value (Environmental 
Defense Fund, 1999, p. 6). Fewer than 5% of the Bagyéli people affected by 
the pipeline secured any paid employment on the pipeline project. They 
received little compensation and few of the promised healthcare facilities 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2004, p. 92).The project resulted in 
construction of roads which also paved the way for loggers and poachers to 
enter remote areas and with it new diseases and threats to wildlife (Friends of 
the Earth,  2001, 2002). 
 
The project was supposed to be preceded by adequate public consultations, 
but civil society organisations complained of lack of public information. The 
Environmental Defense Fund (1999) noted that “The public consultations that 
the World Bank insisted on holding resembled a political party‟s meetings 
where only propaganda is presented. The oil exploitation was depicted as 
something positive, with no mention of environmental risks or the rights of 
local populations. Pretty video films were shown to distract the population, the 
majority of which are illiterate and do not understand what is happening” (p. 
7). Often military personnel were present during public meetings making it 
very difficult for people to voice their concerns.  Amnesty International (2006) 
notes that during the 2001 presidential race in Chad, incumbent candidate 
General Idriss Déby had the opposition leader Ngarledji Yorongar arrested. 
One of the “crimes” for which he was charged and tortured was his opposition 
to the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline. President Déby used part of his $25 
million signing-on bonus from oil companies to buy arms for his supporters.  
 
The inauguration of the pipeline prompted a national day of mourning by civil 
groups in Chad as many villagers claimed that the project had denied them 
access to clean water, farmers were unable to access their lands, and due to 
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oil spillage fish stocks off Cameroon‟s coast had been depleted. The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) complained that in 
September 2005 the Chadian police broke up demonstrations against 
ExxonMobil, resulting in the deaths of two former employees, serious injuries 
to two and the arrest of 30 people28.  
 
The project has continued to be mired in controversy and allegations of abuse 
of human rights (see Friends of the Earth; Amnesty, Gary and Reisch, 2005; 
Neba and Ngeh, 2009).  In January 2006, the World Bank suspended loans 
and grants to Chad because its government reneged on the agreement to 
spend oil money on alleviating poverty. In December 2005 Chad's 
government revised the Petroleum Revenue Management Law and decided to 
spend a higher share of its oil money on military, as well on schools, hospitals 
and roads. It voted to double the share of money that can be spent without 
oversight from a committee of government and civilian representatives (New 
York Times, 7 January 2006). Following further negotiations, the government 
promised to allocate 70 percent of its oil revenues in 2007 to help the poor 
and the loan facilities were reinstated. In 2007, World Bank instructed the 
consortium to take corrective action to fully compensate farmers in Chad who 
lost land and their livelihoods due to the company‟s actions (Reuters29, 22 
March 2007). 
 
3.2 Some Issues Relating to Stabilization Clauses 
 
The stabilization clauses inserted in the Chad-Cameroon oil and pipeline 
project raise some fundamental questions about protection of human rights, 
the citizens right to seek redress in a court of law, the ability of sovereign 
governments to enact laws and develop a regulatory capacity, the power and 
accountability of transnational corporations, their home countries and much 
more. The stabilization clauses draw attention to the unevenness of economic 
globalization as they seem to be primarily imposed on developing countries. 
                                                 
28 http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/spiritual-uprising/1340; accessed 30 
April 2010. 
29 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2238323720070322; accessed 28 Jun 
2010). 
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Shemberg‟s survey of 88 agreements notes that ”the stabilization clauses in 
non-OECD countries are more likely than those in OECD countries to limit the 
application of new social and environmental laws to the investments” 
(Shemberg, p. 39). 
 
The foreign investment agreements are written in dense legal language and 
often shrouded in secrecy30, making it difficult to organise any sustained 
public scrutiny. In the case of Chad and Cameroon, they have imposed 
binding stabilization clauses on comparatively poor countries for a period of 
50-70 years which the oil companies would not be able to impose on richer 
and more powerful countries. In developed countries, transnational 
corporations routinely manage the risks associated with changed social, legal 
and political circumstances and are not known to directly constrain the 
sovereign lawmaking powers of the state, but they do so in developing 
countries. As the United Nations Commission on International Trade and Law, 
(2001) notes,  
 
“All business organizations, in the private and public sectors alike, are 
subject to changes in law and generally have to deal with the 
consequences that such changes may have for business …General 
changes in law may be regarded as an ordinary business risk rather 
than a risk specific to the concessionaire‟s activities and it may be 
difficult for the Government to undertake to protect infrastructure 
operators from the economic and financial consequences of changes in 
legislation that affect other business organizations equally. Thus, there 
may not be a prima facie reason why the concessionaire should not 
bear the consequences of general legislative risks, including the risk of 
costs arising from changes in law applying to the whole business 
sector” (p.141).  
 
                                                 
30 There are rare alternative examples. Under pressure from NGOs, UK-
based oil company BP published the private investment contracts (see 
http://www.bp.com/lubricanthome.do?categoryId=6070) underpinning a major 
cross-border pipeline project known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The 
company subsequently amended (in 2003 and 2005) the contracts to include 
“Human Rights Undertaking” (Shemberg, 2008) and address some of the 
problems identified by human rights advocates (also see Amnesty 
International, 2003; Baku-Ceyhan Campaign, 2005). Following a campaign by 
NGOs, Mittal Steel also revised some of its stabilization clauses (Global 
Witness, 2006). However, the Chad-Cameroon agreement has not been 
amended. 
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The home countries of transnational corporations have facilitated foreign 
investment through the provision of insurance and export credit facilities.  
Despite their obligations under the UDHR to respect and protect human rights 
they are content for the stabilization clauses to be imposed on poorer 
countries which would be utterly unacceptable in their own territorial 
jurisdiction.  
 
Despite the comparatively poor record of Chad and Cameroon on corruption 
and human rights, the agreement drafted by the consortium did not include 
clauses to protect human rights. Civil society organizations have argued that 
foreign investment should be preceded by commitments to protect human 
rights and institutional structures that build the host state‟s capacity to protect 
human rights (Environmental Defense Fund, 1999; Amnesty International, 
2003, 2005, 2006, Gary and Reisch, 2005; Global Witness, 2006). Though the 
World Bank took some steps to protect some revenues for improving social 
infrastructure the process does not seem to have worked well, possibly 
because the stabilization clauses disabled the state and corporations did not 
prioritise the protection of human rights in their investment decisions. 
 
Historically, the state is expected to protect human rights and provide 
remedies for the injured citizens, but it cannot easily tackle discrimination at 
work, gender rights, and rights of minorities without developing appropriate 
systems of corporate governance, law enforcement and a capacity to 
investigate suspect practices. However, the opt-outs granted by stabilization 
clauses do not enable the host countries to develop regulatory capacity, or the 
ability to monitor corporate activities, identify transgressions and meet their 
human rights obligations. Consequently, the host states may be inclined not to 
honour international human rights obligations and thus hamper the 
development of international standards. 
 
In Chad and Cameroon, some farmers and indigenous people have 
complained that the exploration and transportation of oil over vast distances 
has affected the quality and quantity of water due to leaks, pollution, soil 
erosion and extensive logging facilitated by new roads, etc. This means that 
people are deprived of the resources vital for their survival. Under Articles 11 
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of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) the  
 
“States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone 
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions”.  
 
Article 12 requires the  
 
“States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health”.   
 
The UN Economic and Social Council explains that the right to water clearly 
falls within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate 
standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental 
conditions for human survival (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
2003). All states are required to protect these rights. The UN Council adds 
that  
 
“The obligation to protect requires State parties to prevent third parties 
from interfering in any way with the enjoyment of the right to water. 
Third parties include individuals, groups, corporations and other entities 
as well as agents acting under their authority. The obligation includes, 
inter alia, adopting the necessary and effective legislative and other 
measures to restrain, for example, third parties from denying equal 
access to adequate water; and polluting and inequitably extracting from 
water resources, including natural sources, wells and other water 
distribution systems” (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
2003, para 23).  
 
The state‟s obligation to prevent corporations (third parties) from breaching 
human rights rests upon the assumption that it can exercise its sovereign right 
to enact laws and build capacities to regulate important areas of public policy. 
However, the ability of poor developing countries to meet these obligations is 
hampered by stabilization clauses, which could remain in effect for 50-70 
years, and can limit their capacity to fulfil present and future obligations under 
their constitution and international treaties. 
 
To facilitate clean water the state may have to impose levies on the oil 
consortium, or impose stringent environment safeguards and in the process 
change the profits expected by the investors who will then invoke the clauses 
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in the agreements and demand compensation. The state now faces the 
dilemma of either preserving the sanctity of the investment agreement or 
neglecting its human rights obligations. Often poor states will not have the 
means to conduct the necessary tests to establish the levels of pollution in 
water supply, rivers and lakes and even if they could they may not be in a 
position to apply the principle of the “polluter pays31”, because stabilization 
clauses may constrain the host state from introducing such laws. The net 
effect of such clauses is to shift financial and social costs to citizens of the 
host countries. Faced with a radically changed environment the host state 
could favour unilateral termination of the investment agreement, but this may 
result in heavy compensation payable to transnational corporations. Perhaps, 
Chad and Cameroon could have insisted on „change of circumstances‟ 
clauses in the agreement and thus enabling them to make desirable changes. 
The difficulty is that there are numerous formulations of „circumstances‟ and it 
is almost impossible to compile an exhaustive list. In any case, the negotiation 
of agreements depends on the relative bargaining strength of the parties and 
poor countries are no match for the economic might of transnational 
corporations. It is worth noting that Exxon‟s 1996 revenues of $134.2 billion 
were 26 times greater than the gross domestic product (GDP) of Chad. In 
2008 Chad and Cameroon had estimated GDP32 of $6.7 billion and $21.8 
billion respectively, compared to ExxonMobil sales revenues of $443 billion33.  
 
For any state to hold a corporation to account it needs to develop a legal 
infrastructure, but under the investment agreements the disputes are referred 
to international arbitration panels. The courts in Chad and Cameroon are not 
allowed to develop capacities to hear complex arguments, or question the 
relative neglect of human rights in investment agreements. As a result, it 
becomes difficult to build the legal expertise and train judges and lawyers to 
                                                 
31 Recently, The UK-based oil company Oil giant BP has been persuaded by 
the US government to put $20bn (£13.5bn) in a compensation fund for victims 
of the Gulf oil spill and company ahs also agreed not to pay dividend to its 
shareholders (BBC News, 17 June 2010; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/us_and_canada/10335114.stm).  
32 As per the World Bank statistics 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf; 
accessed 3 July 2010) 
33 As per the company‟s annual financial statements. 
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craft new laws and investigative capacities. The judgement of arbitration 
panels is based upon interpretation of clauses in investment agreements 
rather than any domestic law or the host state‟s human rights obligations. 
 
The right to an effective recourse in a domestic court of law is a key element 
of human rights guarantees. However, the stabilization clauses obstruct the 
possibilities of a legal remedy. The affected people have little or no recourse 
against the oil companies because they are not a direct party to the contract 
and often will not know the identity and standing of numerous sub-contractors 
and financiers involved on the project. The oil consortium claims to voluntarily 
apply the highest ethical and environmental standards, but they are always 
vague and capable of being easily diluted to meet commercial imperatives 
and do not give the local population any enforceable rights. The investing 
companies can make these standards as high sounding as possible, but they 
are not enforceable in any local court because they are not written into any 
law. The agreements may guarantee 24/7 electricity and water to the oil 
consortium, possibly by diverting it away from farmers and other local people, 
and as a result have an adverse impact on their livelihood. However, the 
people have little recourse against the government because the contracts are 
between the oil companies and two local limited liability companies (TOTCO 
and COTCO) even though the Chad and Cameroon governments hold 
minority stake in them. The people, if they can muster sufficient political and 
financial resources, may litigate against their governments, but such steps are 
also fraught with difficulties because the local state may have rarely 
guaranteed them clean water or a pristine environment. Thus the 
constitutional wrangling could last for decades. The terms of the investment 
agreements take precedence over local laws and if to meet street protests the 
host state resorts to passing new laws to protect worker rights, pensions, 
freedom of expression, the environment or the rights of the indigenous people, 
it may need to pay compensation34 to oil companies, which paradoxically 
                                                 
34 In 2009, an arbitration panel decided that Mexico should pay compensation 
of  $170m to foreign investors (including $77m to Cargill Inc., other companies 
were Archer Daniels Midland, Tate & Lyle and Corn Products International) 
after US agricultural companies complained that Mexico slapped a 
discriminatory tax on their cross-border investments in the high-fructose corn 
syrup sweetener market (FDI Magazine, 15 October 2009 
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drains the scarce resources available for economic and social development. 
Governments fearful of upsetting corporations may well resort to strong-arm 
tactics to quell demands for social change. The stabilization clauses prioritise 
commercial interests over concerns about social justice and inhibit the state 
from meeting demands for the protection of human rights.   
 
In principle, the host government could develop a two-tier system of laws: one 
applying to the enclave of the project and another for the rest of the country, 
but this is divisive and a recipe for social resentment and conflicts. The project 
area effectively functions as a state-within-a-state governed by the clauses of 
an investment agreement and the people living within that area are expected 
to accept inferior standards of healthcare and social rights (Global Witness, 
2006). The stabilization clauses sharpen social conflict and a sense of social 
grievance and could encourage civil wars and secessionist movements. Thus 
the stabilization clauses become the means for violating international treaties 
and standards on human rights and encourage the state to clamp-down on 
protests and democratic dissent. 
 
3.3. Some Accounting and Accountability Issues 
 
The section examines three technologies that might amplify corporate 
accountability and respect for human rights. These are conventional financial 
reports, corporate social responsibility reports and production of shadow, or 
social, accounts, which could be mobilised to highlight the impact of foreign 
investment agreements, stabilization clauses and erosion of state sovereignty. 
 
Stabilization clauses affect the quality of profits and social costs associated 
with generation of economic wealth. So how have the companies rendered an 
account of their operations in Chad and Cameroon, especially as they 
                                                                                                                                            
(http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/3035/Large_fines_leave_
sour_taste_in_Mexico.html); accessed 24 June 2010). In another case, in 
2008, the Peruvian government successfully defended a claim by Delaware-
based Aguaytia Energy LLC for $142 million compensation by arguing that 
though stabilization clauses freeze some laws they do not create new 
substantive rights (for further detail see 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AguaytiaAward.pd;; accessed 2 July 2010). 
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espouse commitment to “respect for human rights [and] applying national laws 
and universally recognized principles …” (ExxonMobil, 2010, p. 45)? It is not 
too unreasonable to expect that these promises warrant some disclosures 
about company policies about the quality of profits, or even disclosures about 
the effects on the local population. With this in mind, ExxonMobil‟s 2009 
annual report35, the most recent available, was examined but it contained no 
information about stabilization clauses relating to any of its foreign investment 
agreements. The phrase “human rights” could not be found in the annual 
report. Despite the segmental analysis36 there was no information about the 
profits made in Chad or Cameroon, even though in the context of those 
economies they may be very material. The same silences are also present in 
the 2009 annual report37 of Chevron. Some of these shortcomings are due to 
the class and ideological interests embedded within accounting, which 
privilege the narrow interests of capital and seem incapable of reporting the 
impact of corporate practices on a wide variety of social constituencies 
(Johnson, 1972; Puxty, 1986). The accounting calculations inoculate 
management from consideration of the social costs of profits. The emphasis, 
for example in the income statement, is on celebrating the victory of capital on 
other social constituencies and appeasing markets by reporting higher profits. 
The social consequences are frequently considered to be externalities and 
little attempt is made to incorporate social costs into any business decision 
(Bebbington et al., 2001). Alternative forms of annual financial statements, 
such as Value Added Statements (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1999), can show how the 
corporate wealth is allocated amongst providers of finance (e.g. 
shareholders), human capital (e.g. employees) and society (e.g. taxation), but 
the underlying theories and the logic of capital maintenance, costs and 
rewards remain aligned with the interests of capital (for a discussion see 
Whittington, 2007) and neglect other social constituencies. Perhaps, there are 
pressures from institutions to improve the quality of accounting practices and 
                                                 
35http://thomson.mobular.net/thomson/7/3095/4222/document_0/XOM_SAR0
9.pdf; accessed 4 January 2011. 
36 This is governed by International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 8 
and gives management considerable discretion in determining business 
segments.  
37http://www.chevron.com/annualreport/2009/documents/pdf/Chevron2009An
nualReport_full.pdf; accessed 5 January 2011. 
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disclosures, but human rights do not get a mention in corporate governance 
codes (for example see, Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, 1992; Financial Reporting Council, 2010) and international 
accounting and auditing standards. 
 
Perhaps, oil companies respond to concerns about human rights in their 
corporate social responsibility reports. Therefore, the 2009 CSR report of 
ExxonMobil was examined. It emphasised that the company promotes 
“respect for human rights and serves as a positive influence in communities 
where we operate” (ExxonMobil, 2010, p. 44). The report mentions that the 
company is making economic contribution to the development of Chad and 
Cameroon by empowering women, supporting small businesses, facilitating 
local supply chains, leadership and skills training and making people aware of 
health hazards, such as malaria. However, the 52 page report does not 
provide any information about the stabilization clauses in its investment 
agreements or their impact on the local population. The 48 page social 
responsibility report published by Chevron states that the company is “deeply 
committed to conducting business in a socially responsible and ethical 
manner, and this report outlines our efforts to continually improve our 
performance and practices” (Chervron, 2010, p. ii). Interestingly, in contrast to 
the emerging literature (for example see, Jochnick, 1999; Ratner, 2001; 
Peterson, 2006; Cronin-Furman, 2010) the company pins the prime 
responsibility for protection of human rights on the state by adding that 
“Although governments have the primary duty to protect and ensure human 
rights, Chevron recognizes that it has a responsibility to respect human rights 
and can play a positive role in communities where we operate” (Chervron, 
2010, p. 39). The company provides a lot of positive news about its 
healthcare, environmental and education projects, but nothing about any 
stabilization clauses that it has imposed through its investment agreements or 
whether any of its commercial programmes have yielded negative outcomes 
for the local population. The selectiveness of information is consistent with 
prior research which notes that the disclosures are dependent upon 
management discretion and are primarily driven by a business case for 
supporting social responsibility initiatives (for example, see Adams, 2004; 
Unerman and O‟Dwyer, 2007). Given corporate obsessions of presenting 
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themselves in good light, it is unlikely that companies will ever voluntarily 
reveal the negative social impact of their operations. There are calls 
interventions by the state to draft legislative frameworks to demand more 
meaningful information (Archel et al., 2009), but the regulatory capacities of 
many developing countries are disabled by stabilization clauses in foreign 
investment agreements and they are unlikely to be in a position to develop 
any binding standards. Corporations are also willing to use their investment 
power to discipline host governments. For example, an ExxonMobil executive 
was quoted as saying to Wall Street Journal (October 14, 1997) that "Poor 
developing countries cannot afford environmental protection. If they insist on 
such measures, foreign investment might go elsewhere” (cited in 
Environmental Defense Fund, 1999, p. 2). 
 
Oil companies operate in societies marked by inherent antagonisms. The 
structural contradictions cannot be dissolved by conventional accounting or 
CSR reports (Puxty, 1996). The silences in the official media have persuaded 
the marginalised to mobilise others and give visibility to their concerns through 
competing discourses amplified by leaflets, oratory, street-theatre, music, art 
and comedy (Thompson, 1968; Cooper et al., 2005; Spence, 2009). In the 
case examined here, social accounts of the stabilization clauses in the Chad-
Cameroon investment agreements and their impact on the lives of ordinary 
people were provided by civil society organisations (for example, Amnesty 
International, 2003, 2005, 2006; Environmental Defense Fund, 1999; Friends 
of the earth, 2007). They used publicly available information as well as the 
contents of the investor agreements to construct an alternative account that 
specifically focused on human rights of the affected people. In this process, 
they were assisted by public spirited lawyers and academics. The social 
accounts sought to corroborate corporate claims with the lived experiences of 
the individuals directly affected and found them to be deficient. The civil 
society organisations visited remote parts of the countries, organised and 
attended public meetings, collected testimonies and engaged with the oil 
companies, the World Bank, the IMF and other institutions to create 
possibilities of public scrutiny. The increased public sensitivities may not have 
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diluted the stabilization clauses in the Chad-Cameroon agreements38, but the 
resulting dynamic dialogue has created space for possible reforms of investor 
agreements and stabilization clauses (Shemberg, 2008; United Nations 
Human Rights Council, 2009, 2009). The social accounts signalled that 
corporate practices will be resisted and exposed. Such engagements may 
also persuade companies to broaden the scope of their CSR reports as 
continued silence may signal dishonesty and callousness. Nevertheless, 
social accounts, rest upon the mobilisation of adequate financial, human and 
legal resources for civil society organisations and they are under constant 
pressure of enrolment and inducement of corporate sponsorships (Gray, 
Bebbington and Collison, 2006). 
 
4. Summary and Discussion 
 
Foreign investment and trade is an inevitable feature of contemporary 
economic globalization and has strengthened the power of transnational 
corporations. This paper has sought to draw attention to some of the 
challenges that it poses for the enjoyment and protection of human rights 
through a partial examination of a foreign investment agreement39. It 
specifically drew attention to the impact of stabilization clauses which raise 
major legal, political, social, ethical and moral issues (for an indication see, 
Amnesty International 2005, 2006; Leader, 2006; Cotula, 2008; Macleod, 
2008; Neumayer, 1999; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2008, 2009; 
Černič, 2010). Stabilization clauses are a reminder of the way profits are 
                                                 
38 Under pressure from civil society organisations, UK-based oil company BP 
published the private investment contracts (see 
http://www.bp.com/lubricanthome.do?categoryId=6070) relating to a major 
cross-border pipeline project known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The 
company subsequently amended (in 2003 and 2005) the contracts to include 
“Human Rights Undertaking” (Shemberg, 2008) and addressed some of the 
problems identified by human rights advocates (see Amnesty International, 
2003; Baku-Ceyhan Campaign, 2005). Following a campaign by NGOs, Mittal 
Steel also revised some of its stabilization clauses (Global Witness, 2006). 
However, the Chad-Cameroon agreement has not been amended. 
39 It may be argued that investment and trade per se are not necessarily the 
cause of human rights problems or violations, but rather the agreements have 
effects which encourage governments and corporations to ignore human 
rights obligations, or constrain governments from taking steps to improve 
human rights. 
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prioritised and human rights are marginalised in business practices. The 
neoliberal project insists that civil and political freedoms are a necessary by-
product of economic growth, but the Chad-Cameroon project examined in this 
paper shows that corporations view economic growth purely in terms of 
financial and contractual obligations. One might argue that economic, social, 
cultural and political rights are a necessary condition for reduction of poverty, 
economic stability and enabling citizens to live fulfilling lives, but they are 
excluded from investment agreements.  
 
The rise of corporate power has compromised the autonomy of the state and 
constrained its ability to pursue what could be regarded as national priorities 
or citizens‟ rights. These developments have not been accompanied by 
changes in corporate accounting and accountability practices. One might look 
to accounting academics for advances that might humanise accounting, but 
such prospects remain poor, especially as a large volume of research 
published in leading academic journals privileges narrow technocratic issues 
and is rarely concerned with “an examination of the accounting issues 
associated with new forms of financial and economic transaction[s] …” 
(Unerman and O‟Dwyer, 2010, p. 19). It is also doubtful that accounting and 
CSR developments can dilute the systemic pressures to report higher 
earnings or the executive quest for greater financial rewards, which are the 
key drivers of foreign investment, stabilization clauses and subordination of 
human rights to profits (Puxty, 1986). 
 
In recent years, companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron have made 
references to human rights40 in their CSR reports, but too often the logic of 
cold economic calculations dominates investment decisions. The contents of 
CSR reports are mostly voluntary and it is rare for companies to voluntarily 
disclose the actual or potential negative impact of corporate practices on 
human rights. In any case without independent corroboration from 
stakeholders, corporate statements are likely to be seen as little more than 
publicity stunts. Such tensions are rarely addressed in contemporary 
                                                 
40 BP, another oil company, also publishes guidance on human rights 
(http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/d
ownloads/BP_Human_Rights_2005.pdf; accessed 4 July 2010).  
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developments. For example, since 2003 the banking industry has voluntarily 
adopted what have come to be known as the Equator Principles41, effectively 
a common standard for managing social and environmental issues related to 
the financing of development projects costing more that US$10 million. This 
screening is supposed to address protection of human rights and community 
health; environmental, safety and security issues by screening a project 
against the host country‟s laws and regulations and extant international 
treaties and agreements, but campaigners42 have claimed that it is business 
as usual and that voluntary approaches have not addressed humanitarian 
problems (The Guardian, 14 January 2010). In most cases, the assessments 
carried out by banks remains secret and have not enhanced transparency and 
accountability of transnational corporations.  The UK‟s 1995 Pension Act (as 
amended in July 2000) is another example of the way human rights agenda is 
resisted and accommodated. The Act requires the Trustees of occupational 
pension schemes to disclose through their Statement of Investment Principles 
(SIPs) “the extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or ethical 
considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention and 
realisation of investments”. However, the legislation does not require 
companies to explicitly embrace human rights, publish investment 
agreements, or disclose how human rights are explicitly considered in their 
investment decisions.  
 
Within the neoliberal paradigm, a framework developed by the United Nations 
United Nations Human Rights Council (2008, 2009) seeks to address some of 
the tensions identified above.  It states that corporations have a responsibility 
to respect human rights and the state has a “duty to protect against human 
rights abuses by third parties, including business” (United Nations Human 
Rights Council, 2008, para 9) and both need to provide access to remedies for 
violations. It recommends that alongside their assessment of financial and 
business risks, corporations should carry out a process of due diligence for 
                                                 
41 For details see http://www.equator-
principles.com/documents/Equator_Principles.pdf; accessed 2 July 2010. 
42 Their criticisms are listed in a long letter 
(http://www.banktrack.org/download/bold_steps_forward_towards_equator_pri
nciples_that_deliver_to_people_and_the_planet/100114_civil_society_call_eq
uator_principles.pdf; accessed 5 July 2010). 
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their projects “whereby companies not only ensure compliance with national 
laws but also manage the risk of human rights harm with a view to avoiding it 
… take proactive steps to understand how existing and proposed activities 
may affect human rights” (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2008, paras 
25, 61). The framework recommends that corporations should provide the 
“means for those who believe they have been harmed to bring this to the 
attention of the company and seek remediation, without prejudice to legal 
channels available” (United Nations Human Rights council, 2008, para 82). 
More interestingly, the UN framework recommends that member states should 
“foster a corporate culture respectful of human rights at home and abroad” 
(para 27). The difficulty with the above proposals is that due to the impact of 
stabilization clauses some states, such as Chad and Cameroon, are not in a 
position to call giant transnational corporations to account. Civil society 
organisations have been effective in elevating the human rights agenda 
through production of social accounts, but the UN framework does not do 
anything to strengthen such possibilities. For example, as corporations are 
displacing the state they should be subjected to the freedom of information 
laws and required to publish investment agreements so that the public can 
corroborate their claims of protecting human rights. The imposition of such 
laws by the countries where transnational corporations are headquartered 
would help to mitigate the comparative powerlessness of citizens in many 
developing countries. Thus the public availability of investor agreements and 
related information in the US (where ExxonMobil and Chevron are 
headquartered) would have helped people in Chad and Cameroon to make 
sense of their plight. The scrutiny of corporate practices and policies can be 
enhanced by requiring that their directors be elected by all stakeholders 
(including employees, local communities, customers, etc.), but such 
possibilities are eschewed by the UN framework. Perhaps, a balance between 
human rights and corporate power cannot be struck within the confines of 
neoliberal ideology.  
 
The need to make corporations accountable for human rights opens up rich 
possibilities for research (for some discussion see Sikka et al., 1995; 
Jochnick, 1999; Neu and Cooper, 2001; Cooper, 2005; Gray and Bebbington, 
2006; Macleod, 2008; Spence 2009). Scholarly research can play a pivotal 
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role in advancing novel discourses, giving visibility to the plight of the 
marginalised people and showing the social cost of corporate profits. It can 
create possibilities of emancipatory change by examining corporate power 
through the lens of social justice, democracy, power, accountability and 
human brotherhood so that the whole of humanity can live fulfilling lives with 
dignity and respect. The narrowness of accounting practices needs to be 
exposed to create possibilities of alternative forms of reporting. There are 
possibilities for academics to build alliances with civil society organisations 
and significant others and use their expertise to produce richer social 
accounts to challenge the hegemony of corporations. Such alliances open up 
the possibilities of going beyond the corporate glossy CSR brochures and 
self-congratulatory statements to examine the impact of corporate practices 
on the lives of people. There are real possibilities of organisational behaviour 
research to consider possible barriers that organisations might encounter in 
changing organisational cultures and daily routines to embrace human rights, 
and the varieties of organisational processes that have been devised, or could 
be devised, to meet human rights obligations. The spotlight should also fall on 
the role of accountants, lawyers, bankers and other financial intermediaries, in 
devising investment agreements which prevent people from enjoying human 
rights. The role of the home states in constraining the host state‟s ability to 
meet human right obligations should be explored. The role of global agencies, 
such as the World Bank, would need to be scrutinised. A focus on human 
rights can reinvigorate accounting, corporate governance and CSR research 
and can help to strengthen democracy, public accountability and provide a 
better world. 
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